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Abstract
Standard models of equilibrium unemployment assume exogenous
labour market institutions and flexible wage determination. This pa-
per models wage rigidity and collective bargaining endogenously, when
workers differ by observable skill and may adopt either individualised
or collective wage bargaining. In the calibrated model, a substantial
fraction of workers and firms as well as the median voter prefer collec-
tive bargaining to the decentralised regime. A fundamental distortion
of the separation decision represented by employment protection (a
firing tax) is necessary for such preferences to emerge. Endogeniz-
ing collective bargaining can significantly modify comparative statics
effects of policy arising in a single-regime setting.
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Despite the received wisdom among economists that labour market rigidities
reduces efficiency and welfare, a broad majority of industrial democracies
continue to retain and even foster institutions which set wages without ref-
erence to local productivity and labour market conditions. Especially in
Europe, the coverage of collectively bargained wage agreements generally ex-
ceeds the presence of organised labour at the workplace, often significantly.1
Surveys show that political support for these arrangements is robust; accord-
ing to the 2001 Eurobarometer, 65% of EU citizens agree with the statement
that ”workers need strong unions to protect their interests”. An on-line
survey of perceptions of institutions conducted by the McKinsey Company
revealed that 60% of Germans consider labour unions to be important for
society - compared with 66% for Greenpeace and 46% for ADAC, an auto-
mobile club. Similarly, a 2004 survey conducted by the Fondazione Rodolfo
Debenedetti found that 40% of Italians consider unions to best represent
their interests, compared with 14% for the current government, 12% for the
opposition and 4% for Confindustria, the employers association. Even in
the United Kingdom, where unions have lost considerable influence over the
past three decades, two-thirds of respondents to the Eurobarometer survey
expressed the view that unions were important or very important for society.
A number of economists, most notably Saint-Paul (2000), have shown
how majorities can arise for institutional arrangements which obstruct em-
ployment adjustment such as employment protection. This paper contributes
to that literature by investigating interactions between employment protec-
tion, labour market frictions, and wage rigidity. The framework for analysis
is the equilibrium search and matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994, 1999a,b) (henceforth MP). We compare the outcome of flexible wage
setting in a decentralised competitive search market with a rigid-wage labour
market in which pay is determined without reference to individual match pro-
ductivity. The form of the wage rigidity arises endogenously as the outcome
of Nash bargaining between a labour union and an employer’s association.
Thus, both the union’s pay scale and its membership are endogenous.
The endogenous emergence of collective bargaining is due to deviations
from idealized conditions in search-matching economies. There is, first of all,
1In France, the land of the general strike, ”excess coverage” is almost 70 per cent of
the workforce. See Boeri, et al. (2001), Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) and Visser (2006)
for more details on excess coverage.
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a firing tax - a deadweight loss to a worker-firm match incurred upon disso-
lution. While the impact of firing taxes has been studied extensively, their
interaction with other labour market institutions is less well-understood.2 In
presence of a firing tax, there is a potential divergence from the optimality
condition identified by Hosios (1990) in models of equilibrium unemployment.
Moreover, a social minimum or norm may restrict pay schedules available to
the parties of collective bargaining. These deviations open up potential for
improvement in the context of a collective bargain. At the same time, wages
in a collective bargain are set independently of idiosyncratic productivity lev-
els and local labour market conditions, and take account only of observable
worker skill levels. This reduces the cross-sectional variation of wages with
respect to the case in which wages are set according to an individualised
bargaining process. As a result, some labour markets are "closed" in that
the highest match surplus attainable in these local labour markets is lower
than the reservation utility of the worker. Individuals having skills corre-
sponding to closed labour markets are involuntarily non-employed as they
are not searching for jobs. This involuntary non-employment occurs endoge-
nously as a function of the assumed rigidities, and collective bargaining takes
these effects on non-employment into account. labour markets which do not
adopt the collective agreement do not close, but rather revert to decentralised
wage setting; equilibrium in our economy is a hybrid mix of rigid and flexible
labour markets.
To examine the quantitative implications of our model, we calibrate it to
the Italian labour market. For our preferred calibration, significant fractions
of workers and firms evince a preference for collectively bargained wages.
In addition, the model predicts that support for the rigid-wage regime is
stronger at intermediate rather than low skills levels, contrary to conven-
tional wisdom. This is because rigid wages tend to increase job destruction
and reduce job creation for the least skilled. Furthermore, in presence of
employment protection, higher incidence of idiosyncratic shocks strengthens
this underlying support.
Another set of findings concern the local comparative static effects of ex-
ogenous variation in institutional parameters and their dependence on skill.
These can vary substantially from those that obtain when collective bar-
2See Ljungqvist (2002) for a recent survey of theoretical work on the frequently ambigu-
ous effects of severance regulation. Ljungqvist and Sargent (2002) have studied interactions
between firing taxes and unemployment benefits. Similar interactions in a different model
setting have been studied by Coe and Snower (1997).
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gaining and real wage rigidity is held constant. Firing taxes are essential
for inducing preferences for rigid wages, and interact with the frequency of
idiosyncratic shocks to productivity as well as startup costs to increase the
attractiveness of the rigid wage regime. This complementarity can therefore
account for the ”clusters of institutional rigidities” observed in OECD coun-
tries (Saint-Paul 2004). Finally, preferences for the rigid wage regime are
stronger, notably at the upper end of the skill distribution, and increase in
the rate of incidence of shocks in the labour market.
In the next section, we contrast behaviour of the benchmark model of
equilibrium unemployment with an alternative in which wages depend only
on systematic productivity (skill). We then endogenize the determination of
this wage schedule as the outcome of a Nash bargaining between an union
and an employers’ association. The equilibrium of this economy is such that
no workers or firms have an interest in changing their wage-setting regime.
Section 3 considers preferences of workers and firms for the two regimes in
the context of a calibrated version of the model. Section 4 evaluates how
rigidities and preferences for them vary in response to changes in underlying
institutions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Flexible versus Rigid Wage Determination
in Equilibrium Unemployment
2.1 Model framework
The building blocks of our model are standard and can be found in Pis-
sarides (2000) or Mortensen/Pissarides (1999) We consider a continuum of
labour markets indexed by s ∈ (0, 1] where s stands for a deterministic and
observable component of worker productivity. Workers cannot change their
skill level and supply their labour inelastically; they are either unemployed
or employed. Firms either produce with one worker, or search with an open
vacancy. They can enter freely and search in any labour market at zero cost,
but must pay a periodic startup or recruitment cost of sk per unit period.
Firms can work with all types of workers but only one at any given point in
time, and cannot search while employing a worker. In a given labour market
of skill s, the probability of matching depends on labour market tightness, for
which the ratio of vacancies v to unemployment u, given by θ ≡ v/u is a suffi-
cient statistic. This matching or contact probability derives from a constant
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returns matching function m = m(u, v); the unconditional probability of a
vacancy to match with an unemployed worker is q = m(u,v)
v
= m(θ, 1), with
q0(θ) < 0, q00(θ) > 0, and limθ−→0q(θ) =∞; the probability of an unemployed





For production to occur, a worker must be matched with a job. When
matched, a firm and a worker generate periodic productivity sx, where x ∈
(0, 1] is a match-specific component referred to as a ”shock.” All newly-
formed matches (i.e. filled jobs) begin at the highest possible value of x
(x = 1). Immediately thereafter, match productivity can change at Poisson
frequency λ, in which case it is a random draw with a fixed, known cumulative
distribution F (x).
In both flexible and rigid-wage regimes, an exogenous firing tax sT is
levied on termination of job-worker matches, with T < 1
r+λ
. This firing tax
is a measure of "job protection" and is pure deadweight loss paid to a third
party or simply dissipated resources associated with government regulation.
It should be distinguished from severance compensation (a lump-sum transfer
from employer to employee upon severance), which in principle can be offset
by a compensating wage adjustment (see Lazear 1990, Burda 1992).
2.2 Equilibrium in a Labour Market of Skill Level s
Flexible wage regime We first evaluate the steady-state, equilibrium val-
uations of states in a labour market for arbitrary skill s, when wages are
perfectly flexible, and use the superscript f to denote variables specific to
flexible-wage markets.3 Given our assumptions, the continuation valuation
by workers of unemployment (Uf), and employment (W f (x)), and by firms
of an open vacancy (V f) versus a job (Jf (x)) must solve the following four
functional equations:














rW f(x) = wf(x)+λ
Z 1
Rf
(W f(z)−W f(x))dF (z)+λF (Rf)(Uf−W f(x)) (3)
3Where it is understood to hold for any arbitrary skill group, the subscript for s is





((Jf(z)−Jf(x))dF (z)+λF (Rf)(V f−sT−Jf(x)).
(4)
Equations (1) through (4) equate normal returns on capitalized valuations
of labour market states to their expected periodic payouts. In equation (1),
the flow yield from the valuation of the state of unemployment Uf at interest
rate r is equated to income in unemployment or the valuation of leisure b,
which is assumed to exceed rT, plus an expected ”capital gain” stemming
from finding new employment at x = 1.
Equation (2) governs the valuation of an unfilled vacancy. All filled va-
cancies begin at a common productivity, so all vacancies must be identical
ex-ante; like Uf , V f is constant for a given skill level. The function W f(x)
in (3) returns the value of employment in a job-worker match with current
productivity x. The implicit rate of return on the asset of working in a job at
productivity x is equal to the current wage wf(x) plus the expected capital
gain on the employment relationship. The lower bound of the definite inte-
gral, Rf , is the cutoff or threshold value of match productivity, determined
endogenously in the model. If idiosyncratic productivity x falls below Rf ,
the match is no longer profitable and the job/worker pair is destroyed. A
similar arbitrage argument determines the valuation to a firm of a filled job
in (4), given the current realization of x and for a worker of skill level s.
Rigid wage regime In the rigid wage labour market, labour compensation
is independent of local or idiosyncratic influences; i.e. match productivity
or market tightness in the particular skill category. It can, however, depend
on observable skill s. Denote this rigid-wage as wr(s). At the moment, this
wage is given to the labour market; it will later be derived as the outcome
of a collective agreement involving a union and an employers’ association.
By assumption, the equilibrium state valuations by workers U r and W r in a
labour market of skill s in the rigid wage regime (denoted by superscript r)
are independent of idiosyncratic productivity x. This will not, however, hold
for the firm’s valuation of a filled job. The functional equations governing
the valuation of the four states are given by
rU r = b+ θrq (θr) [W r − U r] (5)
rV r = −sk + q (θr) [Jr(1)− V r] (6)





((Jr(z)−Jr(x))dF (z)+λF (Rr)(V r−Jr(x)−sT )
(8)
The interpretation of equations (5) through (8) is similar to those of the
previous section. The reservation productivityRr derives from the employer’s
perspective; a job is destroyed for realizations of x lower than Rr. As in the
flexible wage case, Rr will depend on the skill level of the segment, s, as well
as on wr, T and other parameters. At this point, it is natural to impose
a participation constraint on employment W r ≥ U r, where U r denotes the
value of unemployment for a worker in the rigid wage segment. Since we
restrict attention to steady states, this implies that for all s, wr(s) > b.
Valuation of vacancies in equilibrium There are no restrictions on the
entry of firms in any skill segment. Hence, in both regimes the equilibrium
value of vacant jobs will satisfy the free entry condition V f = V r = 0. In the













Flexible wage regime In the individualised wage setting regime, workers’
remuneration is determined by a Nash sharing rule.4 For an existing match
in the competitive labour market, the Nash-bargained wage is given by
wf(x) = argmax
wf
[W f(x)− U ]β[J(x) + sT − V ]1−β
yielding the first order condition
W (x)− U = β [J(x) +W (x) + sT − V − U ] . (11)
4Here we follow MP (1999a,b) and Pissarides (2000); for details see the Appendix.
Detailed derivations of these and other results in this paper are available in a longer
Appendix which can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Combining (9), V f = 0 and (11) evaluated at x = 1 yields a value of Uf ,
which can be used in turn to obtain the equilibrium wage rule in the flexible
regime, which corresponds to Mortensen and Pissarides (1999):
wf(x) = (1− β)b+ βs
¡
kθf + x+ rT
¢
. (12)
Given values of β, s and k, the flexible wage is linear in θf , a sufficient statistic
for tightness in labour markets, and in the idiosyncratic productivity x. The
greater the bargaining power of employers, the more closely the wage tracks
the monetary value of unemployment. On the other hand, more bargaining
power on the side of workers will link wages more tightly with idiosyncratic
match productivity, local market conditions, the cost of an unfilled vacancy,
as well as the lock-in effect of the firing tax and the interest rate.
Rigid wage regime Wages in the rigid wage regime depend solely on
observable productivity s, so wr = wr(s) with ∂w
r
∂s
> 0. This dependence is
parametrized as
wr = w + φ(s− w) (13)
where w ≥ 0 is a contractual minimum below which union wages cannot
fall. While the participation constraint requires wr ≥ b, we also assume
that a fairness norm or a social minimum requires that w ≥ b. In words,
union contracts would never stipulate a wage below the "social minimum" b,
even if s > b. The parameter φ, which lies on the interval [0, 1], reflects the
dependence of compensation on skill or systematic productivity; low values of
φ generate more ”egalitarian” wage structures. The linear form is rationalized
by both equation (12) as well as the linearity of wr in s under flexible wage-
setting in equilibrium, as is shown below.5
5Furthermore, the linear form is a relatively stringent parametrization which imposes
discipline on the calibration exercise presented below.
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2.4 Job Creation, Destruction and Equilibrium
2.4.1 Job Creation
Flexible wage regime The job creation condition in the flexible regime









and is represented in (θf , Rf) space as the JC-curve in the left panel of Figure
1. The JC curve is downward-sloping because an increase in labour market
tightness reduces wages and increases profitability; to restore the zero profit
condition associated with vacancies, the threshhold level associated with ter-
mination of a match must be lower.6 Notice that skill level s itself does not
affect the position of the JC curve, because startup costs are proportional
to skill. Hence, there is no bias with respect to the job creation margin in
favour of a particular skill level.
Rigid wage regime The job creation condition in the rigid wage labour
market is not familiar, but can be derived in the same way as (14) and is
derived in the Appendix as
1−Rr
r + λ
− T = k
q (θr)
. (15)
The JC curve in the rigid labour market is plotted in the right panel of Figure
1. It remains strictly downward sloping in (θr, Rr)-space, since q0 < 0, and
lies everywhere above its counterpart in a decentralised labour market (14).
It is also independent of skill level s .
2.4.2 Job Destruction
Flexible wage regime As in the MP model, jobs are destroyed when
productivity falls below its corresponding reservation or threshold level. In
the individual-bargaining regime, Rf is defined for each skill level s by the
condition:
6Implicit differentiation of (14) gives dRdθ =
(r+λ)kq0
(1−β)q2 , where f is the density associated
with F . Since q0 (θ) < 0, it follows that dRdθ < 0 unambiguously.
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J(Rf) = −sT. (16)
At the same time, Nash bargaining also implies that Rf satisfies the zero
match-surplus condition:
J(Rf) + sT − V f +W (Rf)− Uf = 0. (17)
The free entry condition implies V f = 0, so as in the MP model, W (Rf) =
Uf . Separations are consensual and privately efficient; they need not be
socially efficient in the sense of Hosios (1990).







(z −Rf)dF (z) + rsT = b+ βskθ
f
1− β . (18)
The left-hand side is the flow benefit of a continuing match at productivity
Rf ; this is the current flow product plus the option value of possible future
improvements over the following time interval. The right-hand side represents
the (opportunity) costs of maintaining the match at the threshold value of
idiosyncratic productivity. This job destruction condition (Mortensen and
Pissarides 1994, 1999a,b) determines the upward-sloping JD curve in (θf , Rf)
space displayed in the left panel of Figure 1.7 Intuitively, a higher level of
labour market tightness raises the individually bargained wage and, for given
s, Rf the critical value of idiosyncratic productivity that justifies the match’s
continuation.
Rigid wage regime The hallmark of the rigid wage regime is that the
value of a job to the employee is independent of idiosyncratic match pro-
ductivity. For this reason, employer and employee can disagree about the
desirabilility of continuing a match. As the wage is not the outcome of indi-
vidual level bargaining, surplus division obeys a rule of the residual claimant
type. Let Sr(x) be the total surplus resulting from a match for an arbitrary
skill class s, so for any x ∈ [Rr, 1] we have:
Jr(x) = max(−sT, Sr(x)− (W r − U r)). (19)






s[1− λr+λ (1−F )]
> 0.
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The firm captures all surplus exceeding W r − U r. The maximum operator
applies since the firm can always close operation, here at cost sT .
Unlike the decentralised, individual-wage labour market, the decision to
destroy a job is taken by employers unilaterally whenever Jr < −sT in a
labour market for skill s. A crucial point to stress here is that under the
assumed conditions, W r > U r always.8 Hence, the set of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivities for which the job is destroyed by the employer will not coincide
with those for which the job has zero value to the worker at the assumed
rigid wage. To the contrary, in a rigid-wage labour market, the ”consensual”
dissolution of an employment relationship no longer applies, and there are
always too many separations from the workers’ perspective. Separations are
inefficient in the sense that for some range of productivities workers will be
fired, but at the given wage, they would prefer to continue working. Except
on a set of measure zero, there are only involuntary layoffs in the rigid wage
regime. In contrast, quits and layoffs are indistinguishable in search labour
markets with decentralised wage setting.9
In the Appendix, we show that the reservation productivity Rr for a






(x−Rr)dF (x) = w + φ(s− w)− rsT (21)
The JD-curve, plotted in (θr, Rr) space in the panel B) of Figure 1, is hori-
zontal, reflects the independence of Rr of local labour market conditions. By
inspection, the firing tax T reduces the job destruction threshold and raises
the average duration of a job. In contrast to (18), neither labour market
tightness (θr) nor individual worker bargaining strength (β) appear in the
job destruction condition. The rigid wage influences the outcome via Rr,
which for given model parameters is determined for each value of s as the
solution to (21).
8Combining (7) and (5) yields
[r + λF (Rr) + θrq (θr)] (W r − Ur) = wr(s)− b, (20)
so W r − Ur > 0 if and only if wr(s) > b. On the other hand, firms shut down whenever
x falls below the threshold defined by (21). By inspection, whenever Jr(Rr) = −sT , it
follows that wr(s) > b as long as b > rsT. Since s ∈ [0, 1], a sufficient condition for all skill
classes is b > rT , which was assumed.
9Quits by workers cannot result in material gains in the MP model because on-the-job
search is ruled out.
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2.4.3 Equilibrium
Flexible wage regime. The intersection of (18) with the job creation
condition (14) defines a labour market equilibrium for submarket with skill
s. The result is depicted as the point of intersection in the left panel of Figure
1, a unique reservation productivity and labour tightness pair (Rf∗,θf∗) which
characterizes labour market equilibrium. We will denote this equilibrium by
Rf∗ = Rf∗(s, λ, β, k, b, T ) and θf∗ = θf∗(s, λ, β, k, b, T ), which are implicit
functions of skill s, the Poisson arrival rate λ, worker bargaining power β,
startup costs k, firing tax T and income-equivalent in unemployment b.
Given the equilibrium values Rf∗ and θf∗, the unemployment rate in the
labour market for skill level s follows from the familiar flow condition for
constant unemployment:
uf∗ ≡ uf∗(s, λ, β, k, b, T ) = λF (R
f∗)
λF (Rf∗) + θf∗q(θf∗)
. (22)
Rigid wage regime. The intersection of the JD and the JC curves in
the right panel of Figure 1 yields unique equilibrium values of the reser-
vation productivity and market tightness for the labour market under the
rigid wage regime, which we denote as Rr∗ = Rr∗(s, λ, k, w, φ, b, T ) and
θr∗ = θr(s, λ, k, w, φ, b, T ) respectively. Analogous to (22), the equilibrium




λF (Rr∗) + θr∗q(θr∗)
≡ ur(s, λ, k, w, φ, b, T ). (23)
2.4.4 Closed Labour Markets
A market for labour will not exist in equilibrium for every skill level. We
define a labour market of skill level s to be closed if no vacancies are posted
in equilibrium; in this case the unemployment (or nonemployment) rate is
100%.10 Alternatively, a labour market is closed if for all x ∈ (0, 1] match
surplus is negative; under these conditions no vacancies will be posted and
10Since there is no gain from keeping a worker with a productivity which does not cover
the opportunities costs of both parties, no worker should ever be observed working at a
wage lower than b.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in Labour Markets of Arbitrary Skills
with A) Decentralised and B) Collectively Bargained Wages
the unemployment rate is 100%. Define s as the minimal skill class for which
the labour market is open (θ > 0). The value taken by s will depend on the
wage setting regime. Our model thus captures explicitly both the extensive
margin of labour utilization (the least productive skill level) as well as the
intensive margin (the unemployment rate).
In the case of individualised, flexible wage-setting, as θf∗ → 0, the JC
condition (14) implies that Rf∗ is bounded from above by 1− r+λ
1−βT ; labour
markets are closed for Rf∗ ∈ [1− r+λ
1−βT, 1]. Similarly, the JC condition for the
rigid wage regime implies closed labour markets for Rr∗ ∈ [1− (r + λ)T, 1].
It is possible to derive analytic expressions for sf and sr. For the former,
solve the job creation condition (14) for q, invert it, substitute the resulting
expression for θ in the job destruction condition (18), consider the limit of s













When T = 0, b is the limiting match productivity for open labour markets;
at the outset, match productivity simply must exceed the flow benefit from
leisure. When T > 0, labour markets can be closed for workers with pro-
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ductivity strictly greater than b and who are willing to work for w > b. The
firing tax thus destroys jobs unambiguously at the extensive margin, shut-
ting down low productivity labour markets by rendering them unprofitable.
Surprisingly, this dimension has been largely neglected by the literature on
employment protection.11
We can also derive minimum productivity level for which the rigid seg-








It can be seen that labour markets are closed not only by the direct effect
of the minimum wage w exceeding maximal match productivity, but also by
φ and T , which create ranges of skill levels which exceed w, yet in which
workers cannot be productively employed, so labour markets are closed. As
T approaches zero, both sf and sr approach w. However, for any positive
value of T , sr − sf has ambiguous sign.
2.4.5 Analytic Comparative Statics
We now restrict attention to markets for which s > sf and s > sr, respec-
tively. The dependence of the endogenous variables on the model parameters
in the two regimes is described in the table below.
Table 1. Analytic Comparative Statics Results by
Wage-Setting Regime
Effect of =⇒ s λ b β T w φ
....on ⇓
Flexible wage Rf∗ − + + + − ¥ ¥
regime θf∗ + + − − − ¥ ¥
uf∗ − + + + ? ¥ ¥
Rigid wage Rr∗ − + + ¥ − + +
regime θr∗ + + − ¥ − − −
ur∗ − + + ¥ ? + +
11A common theoretical prediction is that employment protection in the form of a firing
tax has ambiguous effects on employment/unemployment (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990,
but see also Hopenhayn and Rogerson 1993). Recent empirical evidence at the macro
level is less ambiguous (DiTella and McCulloch, 2005).
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An increase in s - an exogenous increase of skill - shifts the JD curve
downwards and the JC curve outwards from the origin; in both regimes the
labour market tightens unambiguously and the firing threshold declines. An
increase in the frequency of productivity shocks and the flow value of non-
employment unambiguously increases unemployment in the flexible labour
markets via their effects on wages. To the extent that a rigid wage does not
depend on b and λ (and w+φ(s−w) > b), job creation and destruction mar-
gins (hence unemployment) are unaffected by changes in these parameters.
As noted above, increases in the contractual minimum and in the slope of
the wage-skill profile in the rigid segment have unambiguous effects on job
duration (negative), market tightness (negative) and unemployment (posi-
tive). Finally the firing tax reduces both job creation and destruction while
its effect on unemployment is ambiguous in an open labour market.
2.5 Rigid Wages as Collective Choice
Up to this point, the rigid wage policy was taken as given to derive the val-
uations of labour market states by workers and employers. In this section
we endogenize the wage rule in the rigid regime to reflect the outcome of a
collective bargaining process between a single union and a single employers’
association, with the objective of improving welfare of workers and firms over
levels attainable under decentralised bargaining. We continue to restrict the
choice of the collective wage schedules to the set of linear functions defined by
equation (13), consistently with the observation of linear profit sharing and
performance-related pay arrangements sponsored by unions.12 In our calibra-
tions, the decentralised wage schedule implied by decentralised equilibrium
is also linear in s.
Denote by Ω the set of those skill levels s for which W r(s) −W (s) and
Jr(s)−J(s) are both positive, and letN be the mass of those labour markets.
Clearly, both Ω andN are functions of the collective wage agreement {w, φ},





12In addition, simple compensation schedules are more likely to be understood by union
members. See Marsden et al. (2005) on the first European Structure of Earning Survey


















where Ω = {s :
¡




Jr(s)− Jf(s) > 0
¢
} is the set
of labour markets over which wages are collectively bargained, and N =R
Ω
dG(s). Wr and Jr represent the surpluses deriving from a bargain which
accrue to a single "labour union" and "employers’ association," given a col-
lective agreement {w, φ}, and G(s) and H(s) are weighting functions giving
the contribution of skill segment s to the overall surplus of the collective
agreement.13 Bargaining surplus cumulates conditional on being positive to
both parties, and bargaining parties take values available under individual
decentralised bargaining (i.e. the MP model), W (s) and J(s), as given. The
parameter γ stands for the relative bargaining power of the collective organ-
isation of workers vis-a-vis the employers association, with 0 < γ < 1.14
3 Worker and Firm Preferences for Labour
Market Regimes: Calibration Results
3.1 Model Specification and Functional Forms
We now investigate and evaluate the properties of a calibrated version of
our model. In particular, we are interested in studying the preferences
of workers and firms across skill classes for the two different wage setting
regimes. Following Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1999), we focus on the effects of a subset of labour market institutions
13As an extension, one could parameterize "solidarity" among members - or a preference




[max (W r(s)−W (s), 0)]η − 1
η
dG(s)
with η ≤ 1.
14We distinguish this bargaining power from that of each individual worker vis-a-vis the
employer, β. As with individual-level bargaining strength, γ could stand for risk aversion
and degree of time impatience in the spirit of the strategic approach to bargaining theory;
see for example Binmore et al. (1986).
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which differ across countries, holding other aspects of labour markets con-
stant. Matching probabilities are given by the functional form q(θ) = Aθ−α
with 0 < α < 1 and A > 0. Idiosyncratic match productivity x is assumed to
be uniformly distributed over the interval (0, 1]. The job creation condition























The job destruction conditions are given by
sRf +
λs
2 (r + λ)
(1−Rf)2 = b+ βskθ
f




2 (r + λ)
(1−Rr)2 = w + φ (s− w)− rsT (30)
respectively. Markets are open when R ∈ (0, 1] and θ > 0. Under these





















in the rigid wage economy. As before, as T approaches zero and w approaches
b, sr approaches sf . The firing tax interacts with other labour market insti-
tutions - individual bargaining power under individualised wage setting and
the productivity parameter under rigid wages - to shut down labour mar-
kets at the lower end of the productivity distribution. In the rigid wage
regime both parameters of the collective agreement w and φ increase sr, and
reinforce each other as long as T > 0. This is first direct evidence of policy
complementarity as discussed by, e.g. Coe and Snower (1997). Below, we
will support this point with numerical comparative statics evidence.
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3.2 A First Calibration Exercise: Italy 1990-2000
3.2.1 Parametrisation
A quarterly version of the model was calibrated to match characteristics of
the Italian labour market during the 1990s, which in terms of union coverage
and labour market rigidities is fairly representative of continental ("Old")
Europe. Many parameter values are standard in the literature. We set the
elasticity of the matching function α to 0.5, the consensus of empirical work
on matching functions (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989; Petrongolo and Pis-
sarides, 2000). The bargaining power of workers β in a decentralised setting
is set equal to the elasticity of the matching function.15 Collective bargaining
has a natural raison d’etre: to correct deviations from the ideal decentralised
model of equilibrium unemployment (Pissarides 2000). The power of labour
in the collective bargaining vis-a-vis the employers’ representative γ is set
to 0.5, which is consistent with the observation in Italy of broadly the same
coverage of workers in firms represented by Confindustria, the employers’
association, and of unions in the form of membership rates. By imposing
β = γ, we do not assign a stronger bargaining power to collective organisa-
tion vis-a-vis the individuals.
The real interest rate (r) is set at (1+ .05)
1
4 − 1. Startup and firing costs
are expressed as fractions of a quarterly level of output at x = 1. The value
of the firing tax (T = 1) is set at three months of output or roughly 4-5
months of pay. This corresponds to the levels of the pure tax component
of employment protection legislation estimated by Garibaldi and Violante
(2006) for Italy. Skill classes are defined in the range (0, 1.0] at intervals of
0.01, and the skill distribution is based on Italy’s 1998 IALS (International
Adult Literacy Survey) scores (http://www.statcan.ca) and is a truncated
normal with mean 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.12; furthermore, we
assume G(z) = H(z) = Φ(z), the cumulative normal distribution.16 The
quarterly frequency of idiosyncratic shock incidence λ is set to 0.10, the
15Hosios (1990) showed that the equality of the elasticity of the matching technology and
the share of the match surplus accuring to workers is a condition for efficiency in search
and matching models in the absence of a firing tax. Moene (1997) has shown that under
certain conditions, competitive search models can attain this condition endogenously.
16Our parameterization of the skill distribution comes from Italian 2006 International
Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), for which the density passes tests of normality at conven-
tional significance levels with a mean score of 253 and a standard deviation of 60. This
corresponds to a standard deviation of roughly 0.12 around the centered mean of 0.5.
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value used by Yashiv (2000) in his calibration of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model to Israeli data. For the parameter k we chose k = 0.15, which reflects
estimates of total startup costs as a percentage of income per capita by
Djankov et al. (2001) and Fonseca et al. (2001), converted to a fraction of
labour productivity using the average 1990s employment rate.
3.2.2 Calibration
Given these choices, the two remaining free parameters are the efficiency of
the matching function, A and the flow monetary value of non-employment, b.
These were chosen to minimize the unweighted sum of the squared percentage
deviations of the model economy’s steady state from average values for Italy
during the 1990s of the OECD standardized unemployment rate (10.7%) and
of average measured (uncompleted) unemployment duration (5 quarters). For
A the search was confined to values less than 1.2; for b we considered the range
[0, .55] to rule out cases where markets for more than 55% of the skill classes
are closed.
The equilibrium of the aggregate economy can be summarized as a union
pay scale {w, φ} and a minimum open labour market s = min(sf , sr). It
is thus a hybrid mix of the two regimes. Adherence of a particular skill
segment to the single collective agreement presumes gains to both worker
and firms. If either the union or the employers’ association derives negative
surplus in a skill segment, collective bargaining fails and the labour market
adopts the flexible regime (i.e. the decentralised MP wage determination). A
labour market in segment s is closed if neither collective bargaining nor decen-
tralised wage-setting regimes generate a positive employment rate (uf∗(s) =
1)∨ (ur∗(s) = 1). Denote by u∗(s) and θ∗(s) the equilibrium values of u and
θ in skill segment s irrespective of the wage regime. The model’s aggregate




employment rate due to closed markets as
R min(sf ,sr)
0




(θ∗(s))α−1 dG(s). At each stage of the moment matching proce-
dure, the union wage scale parameters {w, φ} are endogenous and optimally
chosen; that is, they are the solution of (26), given the model’s other para-
meters, especially A and b. Table 2 displays the parameter values selected
for the Italian case as well as the optimised wage schedule resulting from col-
lective bargaining. The latter is given by w = .373, φ = .55, implying wage
compression vis-a-vis the flexible regime, in which dw/ds is greater than 1
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in the open labour markets. The contractual minimum is aligned with the
value of leisure.
Table 2. .Parameter Values for Baseline Calibration, Italy
.
α (elasticity of q(θ), the job finding rate) 0.50
γ (union bargaining power in collective agreements) 0.50
β (bargaining power of individual workers) 0.50
r (real interest rate per quarter) 0.0125
T (firing tax, proportional to productivity) 1.00
λ (frequency of the match-specific shock) 0.10
k (startup costs, proportional to productivity) 0.15
A (efficiency parameter of the matching function, matched) 0.53
b (income in unemployment/value of leisure, matched) 0.373
w (contractual minimal pay at lowest skill level, optimised) 0.373
φ (contractual dependence of pay on skill, optimised) 0.550
3.2.3 Characteristics of the equilibrium in the calibrated model
economy
In Figure 2, the steady state valuations of employment from the worker’s and
firm’s perspective for both flexible and rigid-wage regimes are plotted by skill
level s for the above calibration. In both regimes, the labour market is closed
for the lowest skill levels. The optimised union wage policy shuts down the
lowest skill labour markets.that are open in the flexible regime. For inter-
mediate skill levels with the mass of workers, the valuation of employment
is higher under the rigid wage regime. At high skill levels, workers prefer
to have their wages set under competitive conditions. From the employer’s
perspective, rigid wages are preferable in the upper skill distribution, but not
so in general in the low productivity regions of the distribution, where skill
density is highest.
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the baseline calibration in more
detail. The equilibrium in aggregate economy has a mean unemployment
rate of 12% with a mean completed steady state unemployment duration of
4.6 quarters.17 Roughly one fifth of the potential labour force is inactive
17Note that the unemployment rate is the average rate of unemployment of those labor
markets which are operating, so in the rigid wage regime, the unemployment rate will
significantly understate the nonemployment rate, which includes closed markets.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium State Valuations, Benchmark Calibration.
Italy
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because the labour market for their skill group is shut down. About 85 per
cent of the labour force (68 per cent out of 79.8 in open markets) is covered
by collective agreements. Both the worker of median skill in the economy as
well as the worker of median skill who is employed supports the collective
agreement. Of all the markets, about three fourths has an advocate at least
from one side of the bargaining table.
Table 3. .Characteristics of the calibrated economy, Italy
Variable Value
Economy-wide unemployment rate (ILO) 12.0
Average duration of unemployment (quarters) 4.6
Lowest skill level employed under decentralised wage setting 0.45
Lowest skill level employed under collective bargaining 0.48
Mass of union support (%) 74.7
Mass of collective bargaining coverage (%) 68.0
Mass of open markets (%) 79.8
3.3 Calibration for Sweden 1990-2000
Given the highly distorted Italian case, it is natural to ask whether the model
is robust enough to account for the average behavior of other economies with
significant union presence. In Table 4, we display a calibration of our model
to Sweden, allowing only the startup cost (k), matching efficiency (A), and
pecuniary value of unemployment (b) to vary. We set k = .10, reflecting
a more liberal product market regulatory environment, while A and b were
selected using the same matching procedure described in the previous section.
Compared with Italy, Sweden has open labour markets for a wider range of
skills: the lowest skill level in the decentralised regime is .36 (compared with
.45 in Italy), while the rigid regime shuts down markets for skill lower than
.42 (.48 in Italy). In Sweden, the income equivalent of unemployment and the
contractual minimum are lower and the wage-skill link higher than in Italy;
collective bargaining is closer to the individualised wage setting mechanism.
Almost 90 per cent of the labour force has skills corresponding to open labour
markets and 9 of these workers out of ten (79.8/87.8) are covered by collective
wage agreements, a result closely in line with estimates by Visser (2006).
Naturally, one cannot expect a model of this degree of abstraction to capture
all differences between the two economies; yet the model does strikingly
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well on the basis of only unemployment income, matching efficiency, and
startup/search costs.
Table 4. .Characteristics of the calibrated economy,
Sweden
Variable Value
Economy-wide unemployment rate (ILO) (u)(%) 7.2
Average Duration of Unemployment in quarters 1.9
Lowest skill level employed under decentralised wage setting 0.36
Lowest skill level employed under collective bargaining 0.42
Optimally chosen contractual minimum (w) 0.30
Optimally chosen wage-skill link (φ) 0.63
Mass of union support (%) 79.8
Mass of collective bargaining coverage (%) 79.8
Mass of open markets (%) 87.8
Memo: Different from Italian calibration
k (startup costs, proportional to productivity) 0.10
A (matching function efficiency, matched) 0.600
b (income in unemployment/value of leisure, matched) 0.300
4 Interactions between Labour Market Insti-
tutions and Endogenous Collective Bargain-
ing
4.1 Trading Places: Counterfactual Comparative Sta-
tics
In order to better characterise what makes Sweden so different from Italy,
we use the model calibrations to carry out a number of policy experiments,
exchanging policy settings and institutional features between the two other-
wise identical European economies. For example, we ask: what would be the
effect on unemployment if Sweden adopted, ceteris paribus, the monetary
equivalent of the value of non-employment in Italy? And how high would
Italian unemployment be if the matching process in this country were as effi-
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cient as in Sweden? The results of these "counterfactual comparative statics
exercises" are presented in Table 5.
The results strongly suggest that the flow value of unemployment b and
entry costs k best account for unemployment differentials between Italy and
Sweden. Imposing Swedish values of these parameters on Italy would reduce
unemployment rate by 5.5 points. Exporting Italian b and k to Sweden,
in contrast, would increase Swedish unemployment by 4.2 points. It is im-
portant to note that b acts more on participation margins, affecting the skill
range of open markets, while entry costs affect the duration of unemployment
in open labour markets. It is striking that introducing Swedish parameters
in Italy reduces the egalitarianism of pay in the collective agreement (i.e., φ
increases). However, the experiment also implies a broadening of the cover-
age of collective bargaining; imposing Swedish labour market institutions on
Italy results in more wage dispersion across skills, but less wage dispersion
within the open labour markets.
Table 5. Counterfactual Experiments
a) Italy with Swedish parameters
Orig. Abs. change resulting from Swedish:
Italian outcome Value b A k b,A b, k A, k
Unemployment rate u:(%) 12.0 -3.8 -1.1 -2.0 -4.8 -5.5 -3.1
Avg unempl.. duration (qtrs) 4.7 -2.4 -0.9 -1.5 -2.8 -3.1 -2.1
Optimal wage-skill link φ 0.55 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.03
Mass of union support (%) 74.7 14.7 0.0 0.0 14.7 15.5 -2.7
Mass of coll.barg. cov.(%) 68.0 15.3 -1.6 -2.2 15.5 14.7 -2.2
Mass of open markets :(%) 79.8 14.6 0.0 0.0 14.6 14.6 0.0
b) Sweden with Italian parameters
Orig. Abs. change resulting from Italian:
Swedish outcome Value b A k b,A b, k A, k
Unemployment rate u:(%) 7.2 2.0 0.8 1.7 2.7 4.2 3.1
Avg unempl. duration (qtrs) 1.9 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.0 2.7 1.6
Optimal wage-skill link φ 0.63 -0.26 -0.02 -0.01 -0.27 -0.25 -0.01
Mass of union support :(%) 74.0 -7.7 2.3 0.0 -7.7 -7.7 0.0
Mass of coll.barg. cov. (%) 79.8 -34.7 1.1 0.3 -34.7 -31.7 1.1
Mass of open markets (%) 87.8 -15.8 0.0 0.0 -15.8 -15.8 0.0
24
4.2 Turbulence, Firing Taxes, and Startup Costs
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2002) have stressed the role of turbulence
in the rise of European unemployment. In their analysis, generous benefits
and severance regulation increase unemployment duration and rates of hu-
man capital loss during periods of structural change and upheaval. Another
interpretation of turbulence is simply an increased rate of shock incidence
λ.interacting with labour market policies - unemployment benefits and/or
severance regulation - have led to lower turnover and increased unemploy-
ment durations. The empirical stylized fact which motivates this literature is
an increasing fraction of earnings variance in the United States which cannot
be accounted for by observable factors. Our model should have something
to say about these issues, in particular: under what conditions could turbu-
lence - the rate at which jobs are subjected to productivity changes - induce
workers and firms to prefer rigid to individualised Nash-bargained wages?
To address this question, we consider the regime valuations of workers
and firms for different combinations of shock incidence parameter λ while
maintaining otherwise model parameter settings at benchmark values for the
Italian calibration. In addition, we consider variation of λ juxtaposed against
variation in the firing tax (T ). A distinguishing feature of our approach is
that workers and firms are sorted into different wage setting regimes, de-
pending on their preferences for wage variation in response to idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. The results of these experiments are summarised in
Table 6.
The top panel shows that support for collectively bargained wages is in-
creasing in λ, provided that the firing tax is positive. When T = 0, the mass
of workers covered by collective agreements collapses to zero, regardless of
the rate of shock incidence. The firing tax is thus a necessary condition for
increasing turbulence to translate into increasing support for wage rigidity.
At the same time, the dependence of optimal φ is not monotonic either with
respect to T or λ. This underlines the complex dependencies and complemen-
tarities between between different policies and driving forces, as well as the
endogenous response of collective bargaining institutions. Our results here
complement the growing theoretical and empirical work showing that policy
interventions are complementary in their effects.
Another key parameter in the MP model is k, the cost of posting and
maintaining a vacancy while searching for a worker. Broadly interpreted,
k is a stand-in for all startup costs related to a firm’s entering a market
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and are often linked to product market regulation, which has gained promi-
nence in discussions of European unemployment as well as the determinants
of economic backwardness and development.According to the World Bank
(Djankov, et al. (2002)) large differences can be observed product market
regulation across European economies. For example, it is estimated that the
number of days required to start a company varies in the European Union
from 4 days in Denmark, 11 days in the Netherlands and 18 days in the
United Kingdom, to 45, 49, and 56 days in Germany, France and Belgium
respectively.
Table 6. Interactions of Job Protection, Turbulence, and Startup
costs: Italian calibration (Absolute Change Relative to Base-
line Calibration)
Parameter configuration
T = 0 T = 0.5 T = 1
Effect of turbulence on: λ = .10 λ = .12 λ = .10 λ = .12 λ = .10 λ = .12
Unemployment rate u:(%) 1.4 3.8 0.05 2.2 0.0 2.0
Avg unempl. duration (qtrs) -2.9 -2.9 -2.8 -2.7 0.0 -1.2
Optimal wage-skill link φ -0.05 -0.05 0.14 0.09 0.0 -0.05
Mass of union support (%) 18.6 18.6 7.3 5.0 0.0 0.0
Mass of coll.barg. cov. (%) -68.0 -68.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 1.2
Mass of open markets :(%) 13.5 13.5 9.7 8.1 0.0 -2.4
Effect of startup costs on: k = .10 k = .15 k = .10 k = .15 k = .10 k = .15
Unemployment rate u (%) -0.9 1.4 -2.0 0.0 -2.0 0.0
Avg unempl.duration (qtrs) -3.3 -2.9 -3.2 -2.8 -1.5 0.0
Optimal wage-skill link φ -0.05 -0.05 0.17 0.14 0.02 0.0
Mass of union support (%) 18.6 18.6 5.0 7.3 0.0 0.0
Mass of coll.barg. cov.(%) -68.0 -68.0 -1.1 0.0 -2.2 0.0
Mass of closed markets (%) 13.5 13.5 9.7 9.7 0.0 0.0
In the lower panel of Table 6 we display the effects of different levels of k on
the benchmark Italian scenario at different levels of the firing tax T . Again,
when T = 0, workers never prefer rigid over individually bargained wages,
regardless of the value of k. When T > 0, skill segments exist which prefer
rigid wages, and their mass is increasing with k, evidence of complementarity
between the two parameters. The collective wage profile is steeper when
entry costs are lower. Evidently, a significant part of the effect of reduced
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k on unemployment comes from the reaction of collective bargaining to the
altered environment. This institutional endogeneity is the subject of next
section and will be examined in more detail.
4.3 Endogenous collective bargaining and the effects
of labour market policies
As highlighted by the discussion of the counterfactuals above, the wage
scale chosen in collective bargaining responds to changes in institutional or
policy parameters parameters, such as the monetary value of leisure (non-
employment benefits), startup costs and the firing tax. It does this to satisfy
the objective of the Nash bargaining problem: to maximize the joint surplus
accruing to the signatories of the wage agreement. This surplus has both an
intensive and an extensive margin. The endogenous response of collective
bargaining may might significantly alter the net effect of reforms when com-
pared with a scenario in which collective bargaining does not react at all to
these policy changes.
Table 7 evaluates the effects on unemployment resulting from marginal
changes in the exogenous variables without (second row) and with (third row)
endogenous reaction of the rigid wage scale. As suggested by the table, hold-
ing φ (and
_
w) constant, reductions in firing taxes have relative large effects on
unemployment. When instead collective bargaining adjusts to changes in T
, the decline in unemployment is milder. The fourth column of Table 7 helps
explaining why this is the case: when T declines, collective bargaining reacts
by reducing across skill wage compression, and this in turn prevents reduc-
tions in employment from having large effects on the coverage of collective
bargaining.
In some cases, the endogeneity of collective bargaining can reverse the
qualitative direction of the effect of institutional changes that are predicted
by simple comparative statics analysis. For instance, a reduction in the bar-
gaining power of individual workers (holding union bargaining power con-
stant) induces a decline in unemployment when collective bargaining does
not react, while it involves an increase in unemployment otherwise, as more
workers are covered by collective wage bargaining than in the baseline. In
other cases, policy actions, such as a decrease in startup costs or a cut in
unemployment benefits, may lead to even steeper reactions in unemployment
than those predicted by an unreactive wage bargaining structure.
27
Table 7. Numerical comparative statics analysis: Response
of unemployment to exogenous parameters, with and without
Endogenous Collective Bargaining, Italian Baseline Calibra-
tion
Parameter
Effects on unemployment (% changes) T b k β A λ
Holding φ constant -0.9 -3.4 -0.1 -0.2 1.2 -1.7
Allowing φ to react -0.3 -4.0 -0.4 0.6 0.9 -0.8
% change in φ 0.5 -1.5 0.1 1.3 -0.1 0.6
Effects of a one percent decline of each exogenous parameter on the unemployment rate
at unchanged rigid wage scale and allowing φ to react
4.4 The role of fundamental distortions
In Section 4.2 it was shown that preferences for collective bargaining col-
lapse when the firing tax is zero. Since the model actually contains three
distortions - firing tax, a pay norm in work irrespective of productivity, and
a potential deviation from the Hosios condition - it is natural to ask which
of the three, if any, are necessary for the emergence of preferences for collec-
tive bargaining. Figure 3 depicts how preferences for collective bargaining
and rigidities arise from interactions between labour market institutions and
these fundamental distortions of the prototypical MP model. The first frame
A) displays the baseline Italian calibration for reference. The second frame
B) is the same calibration with β = .7; the bargaining power of individual
workers in decentralized setting now exceeds the elasticity of matches with
respect to their presence in the unemployment pool (α = .5). In the third
frame C) we maintain β > α as in the second case, while removing the re-
striction on the contractual wage at zero productivity w > b . In all three
cases, a significant fraction of the labour force enjoys a higher surplus in
employment under rigid wages.
In the last three panels the firing tax is set to zero. In panel D), the
binding minimum is w > b is restored but the set of skill levels in collecting
bargaining is empty. This is not changed significantly by raising β to 0.7,
depicted in E). Finally, the case of no distortions at all is shown in F): T =
0, β = α, and w unrestricted. Under these idealized conditions, collective
bargaining simply replicates the Mortensen-Pissarides decentralised outcome.
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Evidently, the firing tax is central to inducing worker preferences.
5 Conclusions
Deviations from the standard model of equilibrium unemployment can induce
worker and firm preferences for rigid wages over those set in individualised
Nash bargaining. We show this in a model of equilibrium unemployment
which allows labour market segments for different skill levels to select their
own mode of wage determination. We thus move beyond Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994,1999) and Pissarides (2000), who assumed individualised.wage
determination with no role for collective bargaining, and provide a justifica-
tion for wage rigidity sought by Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) in a somewhat
different context. In presence of a distortion of the separation decision - a
firing tax - collective bargaining is preferred by workers and employers to
decentralised bargaining for a wide range of skill levels. Rigid wages can
be thought of as a commitment device which supresses holdup under decen-
tralised wage bargaining in presence of employment protection. Collective
bargaining also internalize congestion-search externalities compared with de-
centralised wage determination, adjusting wage scales to the efficiency of the
matching function, although it does not take into account of the specific
conditions of each skill-local labour market.
Our model highlights the effect of employment protection on the exten-
sive margin of employment by reducing the range of skills for which labour
markets are open. There is no ambiguity in our model as to the effects of
firing taxes on employment although, within each open skill segment, em-
ployment protection has an ambiguous effect on skill-specific employment-
unemployment. Insofar as our model predicts that some positive share of
firms-workers will be under the collectively negotiated, rigid wages, it re-
duces the cross-sectional variation and the volatility of wages in response to
idiosyncratic productivity shocks vis-a-vis the standard MP model, making
it correspond more closely to the data.
While our calibration results are specific to the two countries considered,
Italy and Sweden, some results have a more general, qualitative character.
We have shown that collective bargaining interacts with other adjustment
mechanisms inducing political economic complementarities. One of the key
findings of our counterfactual experiments is that higher shock incidence
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Figure 3: Effect of Variation of Fundamental Distortions on
Equilibrium valuations, Benchmark Calibration. Italy
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λ increases the coverage of collective wage agreements even if it appears
to increase unemployment. Our results point to complementarity between
various types of labour market rigidities, a theme that has been studied
elsewhere.18. In the class of models we consider,19 employment protection or a
firing tax is a necessary condition for support for collectively bargained wages
to arise in equilibrium. Startup costs also make a rigid wage regime more
attractive, notably when there is higher turbulence. Severance protection,
in the form of a deadweight firing tax, increases the relative popularity of
rigid wage policies, because it further increases utility of rigid wage workers
who keep their jobs, relative to the decentralised MP equilibrium. Although
severance taxation is a deadweight loss for the labour market, it can increase
the relative appeal of rigid wage policies for the segment of low-skill workers
for which a rigid labour market exists. Perhaps not surprisingly, support for
rigid wages coming from firms is significant, especially in higher skill labour
segments.
Lastly, our results suggest that policy evaluation should not ignore the
feedback effects of endogenous adjustment of the collectively negotiated wage
schedule to institutional reforms. These feedback effects are important and
may lead to unintended effects of reforms.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of the job creation condition in the rigid
wage regime
Use the equilibrium valuation equation (8) to value a job under the rigid
wage regime at x = Rr, imposing V r = 0 and the fact that at the destruction







Jr(z)dF (z) = wr − sRr − [r + λ (1− F (Rr))] sT
Substitute this into (8) with V r = 0 and obtain
(r + λ) Jr(x) = s (x−Rr)− (r + λ) sT
Now set x = 1 and use the zero profit condition in the rigid wage regime (10)
to obtain the JC-condition:








− T = k
q (θr)
(31)
7.2 Derivation of the job destruction condition in the
rigid wage regime
Rewrite the job valuation equation (8) and impose V r = 0 to obtain
(r + λ) Jr(x) = sx− wr + λ
Z 1
Rr
Jr(z)dF (z)− λF (Rr)sT. (32)
Substitute Jr(z) = s(z−R
r)
(r+λ)
− sT in the integral on the right hand side:






−λ [1− F (Rr)] sT − λF (Rr)sT




(z −Rr) dF (z)− λsT. (33)
34
Imposing x = Rr and Jr(Rr) = −sT yields the condition for job destruction:
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